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Legionary Life on Commemorating a Soldier

Tombstones laid for deceased soldiers were methods of displaying personal success and individual identity especially within the legion. The tombstones were often erected and executed by their comrades in arms. As most who received them either had purchased their burial rites before their death or were given to them by fellow soldiers (Hope, 87). A Roman soldier could pay into a burial fund while he was in the service. Likewise, a soldier could commemorate his life by having one constructed for him by his heir as a tribute to a life of service for Rome(Matyszak, 192-193).  These acts of recognition were dually a private affair and received for those servicemen who died off the battlefield. Hope asserts:

Rome and its empire were littered with reminders of battles, but it needs to be emphasized that theses ‘war memorials’ celebrated conquest, victory, and power, rather than death, grief, and individuality. In general, communal expressions of military loss, sacrifice, and mourning were not a feature of the Roman landscape.

On the battlefield death was to be dealt with as opportunity dictated. Burial was a matter of convince and practicality. Corpses on the field were unsightly as well as unhealthy. Most fallen soldiers were cremated and some given shallow graves. Precautions were taken by the surviving troops to limit desecrations to the graves but ultimately practicality gave way. Few corpses were transported home and permissions were only given for the elite. One reason being the large numbers of dead soldiers would deter future enrollment. Any mention of the soldier was likely praiseworthy, as funeral processions were to celebrate the glory and honor of Rome (Hope,87-88).

Hopes research helps us construct a society different than our own. But like she suggests we must be critical of our assertions and assumptions reasons being: incomplete evidence, different contexts with in the empire, and personal points of view. 

Tribute to Rome was ultimately paid to her conquering generals and emperors.  Monuments and structures such as Trajan’s Column were built to honor a successful campaign. The epitome of the emperors boasting was a triumph. A triumph as listed by Matyszak was parading of jovial generals and soldiers in which the roman civilians celebrated the success of the emperor and the army was congratulated by the people and by the emperor himself. After the parading the soldiers participate in rituals and later would spend a week partying. Hope states, “A triumph was a celebration of and for the living rather than the dead” (82). On both the scales of mega and micro, tribute was paid for success.

Scene 54. Trajan rewarding his troops. Used with permission. Copyright Peter Rockwell. Via http://www.stoa.org/trajan/images/hi/5.48.h.jpg

Contrasting the triumph as we learn from Livy, a Roman soldier’s death on the battlefield was to remain hushed, silent, and private (22.55).  As Hope puts it, “Trophies and triumphs were about forgetting the dead rather than remembering them” (84). The life of a slain soldier was likely meant to be forgotten and the people to move on. Death of a soldier on the battlefield was in no way a public affair.  Rather it was and isolated moment in which the family of the soldier could find solace. Not to say that death on the battlefield received no public attention for it did, but its recognition was fostered in a private and silent way.

Works Cited

Hope, Valerie M. “Trophies and Tombstones: Commemorating the Roman Soldier.” World Archaeology, Vol. 35, No. 1, The Social Commemoration of Warfare (Jun 2003), pp. 79-97  JSTOR  Web. Feb. 28 2012. 

Livy, Titus. “Livy’s History of Rome: Book 22 The Disaster of Cannae.” The History of Rome, Vol. III  http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-new2?id=Liv3His.sgm&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=2&division=div1  Web. 18 Feb. 2012.

Matyszak, Philip. Legionary The Roman Soldier’s (Unofficial) Manual.London: Thames andHudson. 2009. Print.

Rockwell, Peter. Trajan rewarding his troops. Trajan’s Column. Photograph. The McMaster Trajan Project.  1999. 28 Feb. 2012. Web.

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The Budget of the Roman Empire

Roman Currency (Wikipedia Contributors)

While there is a relative shortage of accurate information about the finances of the Imperial era, it is assumed that state expenditures of the Roman Empire were first and foremost devoted to military payments. It is estimated that these expenditures most likely accounted for half of the revenues of the Empire. Whatever these revenues may have been they were eaten up so quickly that often taxes were increased (or invented) depending on circumstances (Southern, 75-76).

For the average legionary, military life was not a life of great wealth, even though “[Roman] soldiers formed part of the rare salaried class in antiquity” (Bohec, 209). The appeal of legionary life did not lie in an opportunity to earn a large fortune, or even anything resembling affluence. Why then did so many young recruits volunteer for service under rather unappealing conditions? The answer lies in looking outside of the military: conditions of daily life were not much better. When under military service, a “[soldier] could…look forward to regular meals, pay, and free medical treatment form an army doctor” (Herz, 307). Each soldier’s level of pay was blatantly uneven and not dependent upon task difficulty or capability, but upon social status (Herz, 308).

Polybius provides the first indication of the amount of a legionary’s stipendium (pay that initially covered a six-month time period). He states that legionaries received two obols daily, centurions double, cavalrymen a whole drachma (Brunt). Polybius’s drachma is taken to mean the Roman denarius which is the equivalent of 10 asses (Brunt).

Denarii

Denarii depicting various Roman Emperors (Wikipedia Contributors)

It has also been noted that the stipendium is not so much the equivalent of a modern day wage, but more a credit record to compensate for costs incurred by a legionary during the term of service, i.e. clothing, food and arms supplied by the Empire (Brunt). One example of deductions made for a soldier’s foodstuffs over the period of service indicated that “state deductions for provisions were usually higher than their cost, and that the state normally made a profit” (Herz, 311). The assumption has been made that generally, about two-thirds of a soldier’s gross income was kept back and remained under the control of the state (Herz, 311). Perhaps the most distinct example of pay deductions can be seen in a young recruit—with the necessary supply of weapons, clothing and food, a new legionary incurred a large deficit that could only be paid off after a few years of service (Herz, 314).

Although the costs of maintaining a functioning army were certainly the largest portion of the Roman budget, the political and economic benefits provided by the army’s existence cannot be translated into a financial figure. The stability and security provided by the army both internally and externally, as well as the valuable contributions to the infrastructure of the Roman Empire are astronomically important to the history of the Roman state, and “represented the largest organized and qualified work-force that was present throughout the empire” (Herz, 319). Though it was costly, the value of the Roman army was well worth the price required to sustain it.

Denarius of Marcus Aurelius

Denarius of Marcus Aurelius (Wikipedia Contributors)

Works Cited:

Bohec, Yann Le. The Imperial Roman Army. Trans. Raphael Bate. Routledge, 2000. Print. 28 Feb. 2012.

Brunt. P. A. “Pay and Superannuation in the Roman Army.” Papers of the British School at Rome. Vol. 18. British School at Rome, 1950. Pg. 50-71. Web. 28 Feb. 2012. http://www.jstor.org/stable40301480.

Herz, Peter. “Finances and Costs of the Roman Army.” A Companion to the Roman Army. Ed. Paul Erdkamp. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007. Web. 28 Feb. 2012. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9780470996577.ch18/pdf

Southern, Pat. The Roman Army: A Social & Institutional History. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Print. 28 Feb. 2012.

Wikipedia contributors. “Denarius.” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 27 Feb. 2012. Web. 28 Feb. 2012.

Wikipedia contributors. “Roman currency.” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 24 Feb. 2012. Web. 28 Feb. 2012.

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Legionary Selection and Training

The Roman Army did not begin as a finely tuned fighting machine, but it did develop into one.  In the beginning it mostly consisted of Roman citizens who were farmers.  Part of the reason the leaders would choose the type of man for the legion is because they were in good physical condition because the work they did was physically demanding. In the beginning men would join part-time and then the men would return home after a summer of fighting.  Under the leadership of the Roman general Marius, the army began to be more of a profession (Gill, 2012).

The recruitment of soldiers was the foundation on which the army was built upon.  The plan for their training was geared specifically for the requirements of the work which they would be expected to do.  It would take great skill and courage to be able to leap into a trench or the opponent’s line of battle and engage in the type of combat the Romans were notorious for.  The length of time that a soldier would be in training would depend on his condition, skills, and how quickly he could master the tasks that would be required of him.  It was important for the recruits to be skillfully selected, learn to use and care for arms, be in top physical condition and strong.  In addition they had to learn about every situation they may encounter in battle and how to deal with it, as well as learn to obey orders (Stout, 1921).

  According to Vegetius the new recruits should be judged according to their strength as well as their moral characture.  He could see no benefit to training a coward.  They had strict requirements such as height (between 5’10” and 6 ft. at the minimum), good eyesight, muscular build, and long fingers.  Part of the process of becoming a soldier would be giving him a tattoo with the official mark, but the man would have to prove himself before he could truly become part of the military.  The potential soldier would have to prove his mobility and strength, as well as be able to learn to use weapons and prove he had self-confidence. After he proved himself, he would receive the mark and begin to learn the “science of arms” in his daily training (Vegetius, 1996).

The Romans were known for their ability to build military training camps.  This is where the training would take place.  It really didn’t matter if the site was a permanent installation or a place to stay for the night, the Roman military was good at it.  Vegetius wrote, “one could almost say that the Roman military carried a walled town with them were ever they went.”  New recruits would be trained in the art of building these camps as well as entrenchments (Davies, Breeze, & Maxfield, 1989).

Once the soldier was placed officially in training he would have to endure a rigorous routine of training to do many things.  Examples of things that the soldiers were required to be good at are: military step, both running and in jumping, swimming in case there was no bridge to cross a river.  They also had to train with wooden swords that were heavy and shields that were made of wicker.  They were also taught to use the point and not the edge when they were in combat, this way they would do more damage to their opponents.  They were also proficient at throwing javelins and using arrows, firing stones with slings, and using lead weighted darts.  They had to learn to vault onto horses.  This was done by practicing with wooden horses.  In addition to all of the things mentioned they were expected to carry about 60 pounds of equipment while they were marching in full armor (Vegetius, 1996).

All of this rigorous training was designed to give the soldier strength, courage, and the ability to face the enemy without fear, because the soldier would know that he was superior to his enemy.

The image below is a sketch of a what a Roman soldier may have looked like when he was getting ready to face his enemy.

 

http://ancienthistory.about.com/od/romeweapons/p/RomanArmy.htm

 

References

Davies, R., Breeze, D., & Maxfield, V. A. (1989). Service in the roman army. New York: Columbia University Press.

Gill, N. (2012). The roman army and the roman republic. Retrieved from About.com: http://ancienthistory.about.com/od/romeweapons/p/RomanArmy.htm

Stout. (1921). Training soldiers for the roman army. The Classical Journal, 16(7), 423-431. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3288082

Vegetius. (1996). Epitome of military science (2 ed.). (N. Milner, Trans.) Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.

 

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Hannibal’s Roman prisoners

http://www.history.com/flash/VideoPlayer.swf?vid=82261632401

I couldn’t get this video to embed correctly. This is a video created by the History Channel on the Battle of Cannae. There were also some enjoyable YouTube videos of Cannae as well; however, I could not figure out how to give due dilligence.

August 2 of 215 BC, on the field of Cannae 50,000 Romans lay dead. Eight-thousand prisoners have been captured and the victorious Hannibal following the customs of war had made preparations to capitalize on the situation. Modern scholars and historians Livy and Polybius alike speculate Hannibal was in need of provisions in particular financial support for his campaign and fresh troops. As such, Hannibal may not have wanted take Rome, rather it is possible he only wanted to decrease its power and therefore sent an embassy of roman prisoners to settle the negotiations of defeat.

Note: Roman prisoners of war lost their citizenship and patriarchal rights afforded to them. In effect they became the property of the enemy to be exploited or killed as the victor saw fit. However, a roman prisoner of war could gain his freedom by paying his ransom, being recaptured (treated), or possibly petition for freedom if he escaped (Brill’s New Pauly, 878).

Unfortunately for Hannibal, at some point at the during the close of the First Punic War, the customs of prisoner exchange had changed in Rome. The governing body in Rome felt no obligation to uphold the customs of the world which they helped establish (Hopkins, 17-18). This change was an ethical change in society which now held strong belief of honor and what it meant to be a soldier of Rome. Romans were not apt to negotiate terms upon their defeat. Hannibal may have underestimated the pride and society of the Roman state (Lazenby, 42).

Perhaps this Roman notion of honor is best understood from the senator T. Manlius Torquatur, who was under the persuasion to disallow the liberation of the prisoners of war despite the public opinion. He argued two points. First, the prisoners were idle cowards who made no attempt to save themselves. And second, they didn’t truly defend the camp, and in actuality gave up, reserved to their fate as prisoners of war (Livy, 22.60).Further Livy records the senators held other reservations against the ransoming of the captive Romans, the most noteworthy being monetary (22.61). O’Connell coincides that the refusal for the ransoming of the slaves was strictly a monetary one. As he makes claim that the families of the captive soldiers were denied that ability to pay the ransom (168).

Nonetheless, upon these points the senate voted against the ransoming of the prisoners. The decision from the senate was to Hannibal’s dismay, the prisoners we sold into slavery and some slaughtered (O’Connell, 168). Hannibal was ineffective in convincing Roman allies to defect. Thus, Hannibal’s plan was then thwarted as his ability acquire necessary provisions for his army and his ability to create battle with the learning Romans.

Works cited:

“Hannibal Leads Carthaginians.” 2012. The History Channel website. Feb 22 2012, 9:29 http://www.history.com/videos/hannibal-leads-carthaginians-over-romans.

Hopkins, Tighe. Prisoners of War. London : Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton and Kent Co 1914.

Livy, Titus. “Livy’s History of Rome: Book 22 The Disaster of Cannae.” The History of Rome, Vol. III  http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-new2?id=Liv3His.sgm&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=2&division=div1  18 Feb. 2012. Online.

Lazenby, John. Was Maharbal Right?. Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, 41: (1996) 39–48. Print. doi: 10.1111/j.2041-5370.1996.tb01912.x

Messer, Rick Jay. The influence of Hannibal of Carthage on the art of war and how his legacy has been interpreted. MA thesis. Kansas State University Manhattan, Kansas 2009. Print.

O’Connell, Robert L. The ghosts of Cannae : Hannibal and the darkest hour of the Roman republic. New York : Random House, 2010. Print.

“Romans as Prisoners of War.” Brill’s New Pauly: Encyclopedia of the Ancient World. Antiquity Vol. 11 English Ed. 2007.

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Politics and War: Scipio Africanus and the Battle of Zama

Meeting of Hannibal and Scipio at Zama. Adapted from Young Folks' History of Rome by Charlotte Mary Yonge. “Battle of Zama.” Wikipedia.com. Wikipedia. Web. 16 Feb. 2012.

The first Punic War (264-241 B.C.) began as a small conflict in Sicily which quickly escalated into an all out war between Carthage and Rome (“Punic Wars”). The Romans won many of the battles, and the war eventually ended with a peace treaty that gave the Romans control of Sicily. Twenty-two years later (219 B.C.) Hannibal “attacked Saguntum in Hispania, a city allied to Rome, starting the second Punic War” (“Punic Wars”). After suffering a major defeat at Cannae, the Roman armies under the direction of Publius Cornelius Scipio (Scipio Africanus) traveled to Africa and prepared for the Battle of Zama.

From the accounts given of him, Scipio Africanus appears to have been not only a strong general, but also a capable politician in the time surrounding the battle of Zama. There was significant initial resistance to Scipio’s plan to attack the Carthaginians in their own territory by the Roman Senate. They were “persuaded by Fabius Maximus that the enterprise was far too hazardous” (“Battle of Zama”). However, Scipio, who had been elected a consul because of his recent victories against the Carthaginians, apparently had enough political savvy and support to convince the Senate to let him go, but not enough to convince them to supply him with an army of anything more than volunteers (“Battle of Zama”). Eventually he did receive the support of formal troops.

Scipio’s language during the battle of Zama also indicates political savvy. Polybius recounted that Scipio’s reply to a speech made by Hannibal at the beginning of the battle was “That neither in the Sicilian nor Iberian war were the Romans the aggressors, but the Carthaginians” and that “the gods themselves had confirmed this by giving the victory…to those who acted only in self-defense” (Polybius 15.8). This is, of course, frankly false. The first Punic War was started because of offenses on both sides, but Scipio’s statement, if recorded accurately, would have served to validate the actions of his troops and intimidate his enemies. Though it is possible that Polybius may have distorted Scipio’s language in order to strengthen the “righteous” image of the Roman army in the second Punic War, and though it is possible that Scipio himself may have believed that they Romans were completely innocent, it is not outside the realm of possibility that Scipio might have used such a tactic purposefully to his advantage.

One of the strongest indications of Scipio’s political prowess, however, came at the end of the battle. As part of the treaty to end the war after the Carthaginians had been defeated, Scipio requested various things including “a hundred hostages of their good faith, —such hostages to be selected from the young men of the country by the Roman general, and to be not younger than fourteen or older than thirty years” (Polybius 15.18). According to M. James Moscovish, “the Senate had authority to amend treaty clauses issued by its generals in the field, but in the case of Scipio’s terms with the Cartheginians…the Senate ratified them without change” (418). Though the Senate might have changed any number of terms in the treaty, they remained satisfied with Scipio’s decisions. This seems to indicate that Scipio had either enough insight into the Senate to create a treaty that supported their interests, or enough influence because of the significance of his victory that the Senate wanted to pacify him. Either way, Scipio’s political and military abilities during the battle of Zama significantly impacted the empire.

Works Cited

“Battle of Zama.” Wikipedia.com. Wikipedia. Web. 16 Feb. 2012.

Polybius. Histories. Perseus Digital Library. Ed. Gregory R. Crane. Tufts University. Web. 16 Feb. 2012.

“Punic Wars.” Wikipedia.com. Wikipedia. Web. 16 Feb. 2012.

Muscovich, M. James. “Hostage Regulations in the Treaty of Zama.” Histora: Zeitschrift fur Alte Geschichte. 23.4 (4th Qtr., 1974): 417-427. JSTOR. Web. 16 Feb. 2012

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The Diverse Weaponry of Hannibal’s Carthaginian Army

Hannibal employed many soldiers from many different places. His army consisted of soldiers from Africa, Spain, Italy and he even had Celtic soldiers. Each group of soldiers brought their own culturally used armour and weapons to battle with the Romans.

The African soldiers wore very colorful uniforms that came in different varieties. The heavy infantry wore chain mail over their clothes and carried heavy shields. They mostly fought with an assortment of exotic weapons which they were well trained with and proved to be useful and deadly when they wielded them. They also used spears and long and short swords.

The Iberian or Spanish soldiers carried wooded shields and used sling and javelins as well as swords and spears. The heavy infantry also wore chain mail and used the typical heavy roman sword.  They also used the falcata which is a sickle shaped sword made of iron or steel. The falcata is made from 3 lamina or sheet of steel.

an Iberian Falcata

The Celts or Gauls were armed simple iron long swords. The swords weren’t of very good quality and were used more effectively when hacking rather than stabbing (Polybius).  Both Plutarch and Polybius describe the Celts as often ceasing fighting so as to straighten their swords. Polybius and Livy also assert that the Celts didn’t wear any armour and often fought naked.

Sources

Wikipedia contributors. “Carthiganian Army.” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, Web. [Cited 17 Feb. 2012.] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carthaginian_Army

Wikipedia contributors. “Hannibal.” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, Web. [Cited 17 Feb. 2012.]

Knox, E.L. Skip. The Punic Wars: Battle of Cannae. Boise State University History of Western Civilization. [Cited 17 Feb 2012.] http://www.boisestate.edu/courses/westciv/punicwar/09.shtml

Shean, John F. Hannibal’s Mules: The Logistical Limitations of Hannibal’s Army and the Battle of Cannae, 216 B.C.. Franz Steiner Verlag, 1996. [Cited 16 Feb 2012.] http://www.jstor.org/stable/4436417

Pleiner, Radomir. ”The Celtic Sword.” Oxford: Clarendon Press (1993). Print. [Cited 16 Feb 2012]

http://www.unrv.com/empire/invasion-of-italy.php [Cited 16 Feb 2012 Web]

Polybius. Shuckburgh, Evelyn S. (trans.) “Histories”. London, New York. Macmillan. 1889. Reprint Bloomington 1962. Perseus.tufts.edu. [Cited 16 Feb 2012] Web http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0234:book=15:chapter=9

Livius, Titus. “The History of Rome”. Electronic Text Center, University of Virginia Library. Web  [Cited 16 Feb 2012] http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-new2?id=Liv4His.sgm&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=5&division=div1

Polybius. “The Battle of Cannae.” Fordham University.  [Cited 16 Feb 2012] Web http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/polybius-cannae.asp

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Ancient Military Medicine in the Battle of Cannae

The Battle of Cannae was fought between the Romans Republic and the Carthaginian Republic.  The Carthaginian commander was Hannibal and the Roman commanders were Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus.  The war took place near Cannae a town in southeast Italy. Hannibal’s army defeated the Roman army even though the Roman army was greater in number.  The victory is credited to the fact that Hannibal’s army used superior tactics and they were united in their efforts (The Battle of Cannae).

The health of the soldiers before the war and the treatment of the wounded during and after the war was an important part of maintaining the effectiveness of an army. The conditions that the soldiers had to endure and the number of people in an area created complications for the sick and the wounded.  During that time in history medical facilities where important and many times would be based in temporary camps.  The Greeks and the Romans both had made many discoveries for medical treatments by this time in history, so it was not uncommon to have a doctor (medicus) who was highly skilled as well as assistants who would oversee the operation of the medical facility (Goldsworthy).

Ancient Medical Tools

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medicine_in_ancient_Rome#Surgical_Tools_used_in_ancient_Rome.5B3.5D

 

Works Cited

Goldsworthy, Adrian. The Complete Roman Army. London: Thames & Hudson Ltd., 2003.

The Battle of Cannae. 8 Feb 2012. 16 Feb 2012. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cannae&gt;.

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The Battle of Zama

The Battle of Zama was fought in October of 202 BC between “a Roman army led by Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus” and “a Carthaginian force led by the legendary commander Hannibal.” (Battle of Zama)

Scipio set himself apart from other historical leaders by using scouts and spies from both his own, and the Carthaginian army to benefit his cause. When Hannibal came to Zama, “he sent spies to ascertain the place, nature, and strength of the Roman general’s encampment.” The Roman soldiers caught them, and brought them before Scipio to decide their fate, but rather than punishing them, he “appointed a tribune to show them everything in the camp thoroughly and without reserve,” and then “gave them provisions and an escort, and dispatched them with injunctions to be careful to tell Hannibal everything they had seen.” This reaction was so far from the norm that it seemed to charm Hannibal into “a lively desire for a personal interview with” Scipio, at which meeting he proposed a treaty which, although not successful, seemed to hint at some intimidation by Scipio’s tactics. (Polybius)

Hannibal’s terms for a new treaty (Now that they had broken the previous one) were unnacceptable to Scipio, and eventually told Hannibal the Carthaginians “must submit [them]selves and [their] country to us (The Romans) unconditionally, or conquer us in the field.” Hannibal chose to attempt the latter.

Scipio had also been studying Hannibal’s techniques for years. “Having been at Cannae,” He knew most of Hannibal’s tricks, and was able to “trump [him] with a few minor adjustments.” Having seen the use of war elephants before, he knew how to counter them in a battle. After they were taken care of, he used Hannibal’s own “battle strategy from Trebbia and Cannae” (Billau) to defeat him. One might say that he had been gathering intelligence for fourteen years, and it served him well.

Charlotte Mary Yonge, 1880, Hannibal and Scipio meet to discuss terms.

 

 

 

“Battle of Zama.” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 09 Dec  2011. Web. 16 Feb 2012. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Zama&gt;.

Billau, Daneta, and Donald Graczyk. “Hannibal: The Father of Strategy Reconsidered.” Comparative Strategy. 22.4 (2003): 335. Web. 16 Feb. 2012. http://web.ebscohost.com.hal.weber.edu:2200/ehost/detail?vid=14&hid=127&sid=5417bfe7-001f-472d-bf63-d993f5832806@sessionmgr114&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ==

Polybius. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh. Translator. Histories. London: Bloomington, 1962. Web. <http://citationmachine.net/index2.php?reqstyleid=1&mode=form&reqsrcid=MLABook&srcCode=1&more=yes&nameCnt=1&gt;.

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by | February 16, 2012 · 11:27 pm

To Rome!! Or not…

After a victory of epic proportions at the Battle of Cannae, the assumed logical step for Hannibal and the Carthaginian army would be to march on Rome and overtake the capital. With 20/20 hindsight, it is in fact quite obvious that Hannibal’s failure to capture Rome “cost him his one good chance of final victory” and eventually led to his downfall (Matyszac). Livy has recorded that while congratulating him on an incredible victory, Hannibal’s general Maharbal stated:

“That you may know, what has been gained by this battle I prophesy that in five days you will be feasting as victor in the Capitol. Follow me; I will go in advance with the cavalry; they will know that you are come before they know that you are coming” (22.51). Livy records that Hannibal “told Maharbal that he commended his zeal, but he needed time to think out his plans” (22.51). To this Maharbal replied: “The gods have not given all their gifts to one man. You know how to win victory Hannibal, you do not how to use it” (22.51).

One can only speculate his true motivation behind the decision not to march on Rome, but clues exist that help to illustrate a clearer picture of Hannibal’s judgment.

Hannibal (Wikipedia Contributors)

One of the most fundamental, yet easily overlooked reasons behind Hannibal’s decision is his supply of food. Prior to Cannae, Hannibal lacked the sustenance necessary to support an army. At this time he was not receiving any support from Carthage and his troops spent much of their time foraging across the Italian countryside (Shean, 185). Hannibal’s strategy once in Italy focused largely on relying upon Rome’s resources (Lazenby, 43). Shean states that “logistical problems had dogged him throughout his early campaigns in Italy [and] the victory at Cannae brought no immediate relief to these problems” (185). It is not difficult to imagine why Hannibal chose not to drag an already battered, poorly provisioned and underfed army on a 250 mile march to attack a walled and fortified city. Even after a catastrophic defeat, the Romans still had an advantage of an “inexhaustible suppl[y] of provisions and of men” (Lazenby, 43). According to Shean, “Hannibal’s failure to move on Rome stemmed from the least glamorous and most mundane reason of all: no food” (185).

Maharbal’s eager exclamation of Hannibal dining as a victor in Rome within five days is indeed a pretty sentiment, but would be logistically next to impossible. The distance Hannibal’s forces would be required to cover the between Cannae and Rome within five days would equate to a pace of fifty miles per day, as opposed to the usual pace of Hannibal’s army which hovered around nine (Lazenby, 41).  After such a sprint across the Italian countryside, it is highly unlikely that his troops would be able to accomplish anything significant once they reached Rome—a city that was by no means left unfortified or lacking in able-bodied civilians (Lazenby, 41). Hannibal would not only face many who would have already seen military service, but many armed slaves, and all who would rise to defend their country, honor, wives and children (Lazenby, 41; Polybius, par. 109).

It is impossible to pinpoint a single motivation for Hannibal’s decision not to attack the capitol. Food, logistics and manpower may have all contributed to the objections against taking the city. Hannibal may have recognized his disadvantage in the particular type of “trench warfare” that would have been required to take Rome (Lazenby, 41). It is also a possibility that the victory at Cannae left Hannibal with the impression that the “war was already won” (Matyszac, 38). Whatever the reason behind the decision, “that day’s delay is believed to have saved the City and the empire [of Rome]” (Livy, 22.51).

Sources:

Knox, E.L. Skip. The Punic Wars: Battle of Cannae. Boise State University History of Western Civilization. 15 Feb 2012. http://www.boisestate.edu/courses/westciv/punicwar/09.shtml

Lazenby, John. Was Maharbal Right?. Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. 22 Feb 2011. Web. 16 Feb 2012. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2041-5370.1996.tb01912.x/abstract

Livy. Livy’s History of Rome: The Disaster of Cannae. Book 22. University of Virginia Electronic Text Center. Web. 15 Feb 2012.

Matyszac, Philip. The Enemies of Rome From Hannibal to Attila the Hun. London: Thames and Hudson, 2004. Print.

Polybius. The Battle of Cannae, 216 BCE. Book III. Fordham University Ancient History Sourcebook. Web. 15 Feb 2012.

Shean, John F. Hannibal’s Mules: The Logistical Limitations of Hannibal’s Army and the Battle of Cannae, 216 B.C.. Franz Steiner Verlag, 1996. 16 Feb 2012. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4436417

Wikipedia contributors. “Hannibal.” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 14 Feb. 2012. Web. 17 Feb. 2012.

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The Lines of the Battle of Zama

The Carthaginians did not think that the Romans, or anyone for that matter, could stop them from taking world. Hannibal had defeated the Romans with the tactic of circling around them and had taken the Romans and Scipio down. However in 202 BC, Scipio returned to Rome and wanted revenge and take Hannibal down to his knees.

The Carthaginians definitely had the upper hand at first glance. Hannibal had 45,000 people in infantry, 4,000 men in cavalry, and had eighty war elephants (Wikipedia). Hannibal had put his people in three rows, and the last row being farther back than the others with the elephants at the front of his army. “He placed his elephants in front so that their irregular charge and irresistible force might make it impossible for the Romans to keep their ranks and maintain the order of their formation, in which their strength and confidence mainly lay. Then he posted the mercenaries in front of his Carthaginians, in order that this motley force drawn from all nations, held together not by a spirit of loyalty but by their pay, might not find it easy to run away.” (Livy)

However, Scipio used the same tactic as Hannibal did when they had the first Punic War. Scipio turned the tables on Hannibal by having three rows of his army, which only had 34,000 in infantry and 9,000 men in cavalry, but had the infantry all according to the best warriors. “The Hastati first, with an interval between their maniples; behind them the Principes, their maniples not arranged to cover the intervals between those of the Hastati as the Roman custom is, but immediately behind them at some distance, because the enemy was so strong in elephants. In the rear of these he stationed the Triarri. On his left wing he stationed Gaius Laelius with the Italian cavalry, on the right Massanissa with all his Numidians.” (Polybius) The Hastati, Principes, and the Triarri were all according to the classman of the Roman army.

The reason why the Romans had won even with the disadvantage is that they had blown horns to scare the Carthaginian war elephants and the elephants almost completely wiped out the left wing side of the Carthaginian lines. With the elephants out of the way, Scipio made the Romans go behind the Carthaginians and stab them in the back as well as surrounded them, and ultimately destroying them in the second Punic War.

Works Citied:

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0234:book=15:chapter=9

http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-new2?id=Liv4His.sgm&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=5&division=div1

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hastati

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_zama

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